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NOTES

K~n B6 TAi D6ng:' The Fair Housing Act, Language
Discrimination, and Chinese Classifieds
R. Ian Forrest2
INTRODUCTION

W

hile flipping through the classifieds in search of a new apartment, you
come across the following two advertisements:
Philadelphia. Duplex N of town, rent 5K

Which are you more likely to answer? The vast majority of Americans
will respond to the first advertisement, coincidentally picking the more
expensive option, because the nine recently refinished homes in the
northeast part of town will be sought only by those who can comfortably
read Chinese. The Fair Housing Act, as the law currently stands, has no
answer to the economic and civil rights implications of advertising that,
while facially neutral, screens tenants and buyers through choice of
language.
Since its enactment in 1968, the Fair Housing Act (FHA)4 has
worked to integrate housing markets across the United States with an
aggressiveness and breadth unmatched by other civil rights statutes of the
1960s. In particular, § 3604(c) renders discriminatory advertising practices
illegal, with an eye to eradicating bias not only in the rental and sale of
housing, but even in communicating that homes are available. While the

I This is the pinyin transliteration of "S
kf,"or "I don't quite understand what I'm
reading."
2 J.D. 2013, University of Kentucky College of Law;A.B. Religion, 2005, Duke University.
The author sincerely thanks Professors Robert G. Schwemm and Scott R. Bauries for their
guidance and patience throughout the writing process.
3 WORLD JOURNAL (N.Y.C.), Oct. i6, 2011 , at D8. In rough translation, the text reads
"Philadelphia development property. Northeast section, 9 houses newly outfitted and

repaired. All renting 46oo, sale 46oK."
4 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at
U.S.C. §§ 36o-3619 (2oo6)).
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statute's enactment primarily addressed the disparity in housing options
between black and white tenants and buyers,5 it barred discrimination on
wider grounds. Foreign language is not among these barred grounds, and
though the statute makes unlawful any housing advertisement indicating
an intention to prefer a specific national origin,6 the role of language in
this field has been analyzed thoroughly in only one prior case, now forty
years old.7 Advertisers have been free to publish ads which select for the
primary language of their tenants and buyers, in effect targeting first- and
second-generation immigrants of particular nationalities. This system has
provided an end-run to the statute, allowing language-minority advertisers
to discriminate both against other minorities and the public at large. These
practices fly in the face of the integrative goals of the Act.
This paper will show how advertising in a foreign language, in spite of
facially neutral text, violates the Fair Housing Act by selecting for national
origin through a study of Chinese-language newspapers in the United
States and the advertising they carry. Given that case law fails to directly
address this question, a significant portion of the paper will focus on
analogous cases under the roughly contemporaneous Title VII and analyze
its applicability to the housing context. The solution to the problem
posed by foreign language advertisements is to squarely address them
and enforce the FHA to require parity across languages, both to effectuate
the statutory goal of integrating housing markets and to protect language
minorities from illegal housing practices that go unnoticed due to language
barriers. Part I examines the history of the Fair Housing Act in general
and § 3604(c) in particular, establishing both the relevant legal standards
and the general tenor of FHA jurisprudence as a guide for future analysis.
Part II examines the history of national origin jurisprudence under the
civil rights statutes of the 1960s to clarify the established contours of the
national origin category. Part III studies statutory and judicial approaches
to the link between language and national origin and proposes a definition
of national origin specific to the FHA, one which includes language in
order to fully effectuate statutory objectives. Part IV couples this definition
with the legal standards of § 3604(c) and shows how ads that are neutral
in content become discriminatory through the language in which they
are written. Part V outlines how the FHA can fairly be applied to these
ads by balancing competing interests of statutory civil rights aspirations
and protection of language-minority communities. In Part VI, I suggest
5 See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale) (suggesting
that failure by Congress to "abolish the ghetto [would] reinforce the growing alienation of
white and black America" and "insure [sic] two separate Americas constantly at war with one
another .... ).
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2oo6).

7 Holmgren v. Little Vill. Cmty. Reporter, 342 E Supp. 51z (N.D. Ill. 1971); see infra notes
80-83 and accompanying text.
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a compromise course for courts and advertisers to pursue and offer some
best practices for advertisers and publishers in order to minimize possible
liability.
I.

THE

FHA

AND

§ 3604(c):

ENACTMENT, LEGISLATIVE INTENT, AND

SUBSEQUENT JURISPRUDENCE

The Fair Housing Act was enacted in April of 1968,8 following
enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 9 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
10and was motivated by largely the same concerns: integrating the black
and white racial binary of 1960s America. While the FHA was revised in
19741" and 1988,12 the substance of the law has remained largely unchanged
since its inception. 3 As the last piece of a larger legislative scheme that
had already been thoroughly debated and rushed to a vote following the
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, 4 "the legislative history of [the
Fair Housing Act] is somewhat sketchy" 5 and "not too helpful." 16The lack
of clarity in the legislative history has required frequent reference to sister
statutes like Title VII, whose debates are, at times, much more voluminous
and instructive. 7 Unlike its contemporaries, however, subsequent FHA
jurisprudence has so expanded its scope and applicability that the word
"broad" seems a significant understatement. This tension, between the

8 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 36oi-3619 (2oo6)).
9 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (barring discrimination in public accommodations, federallyfunded programs, and employment).
1o

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (2oo6)).
i i The 1974 amendments added "sex" to the list of prohibited bases of discrimination.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 8o8, 88 Stat. 633,
829 (974).
12 The 1988 amendments added "familial status" and "handicap" to the list of prohibited
bases of discrimination. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 5, 102
Stat. 1619, 1619-20(1988).
13

See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM,

HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 5

(2oo I) (recording the broader legislative history of the FHA).
14 While the Fair Housing Act was debated on and passed by the Senate on March I ,
1968, 1 14 CONG. REC. 5992 (1968), almost a month prior to King's assassination (April 4, 1968),
the bill was passed by the House within a week (April IO), 1 14 CONG. REC. 9620-21 (1968).
15 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 E2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977).

16 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
17 This trend began in Trafficante when the Court analyzed standing under the FHA
through reference to Title VII standing jurisprudence, id. at 205, and the technique has been
used extensively by lower federal courts since that decision. See Aric Short, Post-Acquisition
Harassment and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 240 (2006) (briefly
outlining several applications of the Title VII analogy in FHA jurisprudence).
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persuasive effect of Title VII jurisprudence and the fact that the FHA has
consistently construed the same language to give it broader effect, will
guide much of this paper's analysis.
Section 3604(c) of the FHA was enacted to render discriminatory
advertising illegal, regardless of the form of publication it appeared in.' s
In its current form, § 3604(c) in its entirety states that it shall be unlawful:
To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
to
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 9
Even in light of the scant legislative history of the FHA, little time
appears to have been devoted to § 3604(c) in particular. As Robert
G. Schwemm notes, due to a lack of committee reports, hearings, or
meaningful floor debates, "the meaning of this provision must be derived
almost exclusively from the words of the statute, unaided by additional
materials. ''2 ° What little textual evidence exists points to an intent to adopt
broad language and expansive enforcement of the substantive provisions
of § 3604(c),2' a critical element that differentiates the FHA from some of
its siblings.
While there were initially some questions as to the range of defendants
to which § 3604(c) might apply, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Hunter set the tone for future FHA jurisprudence. 22 Although few
questioned that landlords and sellers were within the ambit of § 3604(c)'s
substantive provisions, there was some doubt as to whether newspapers
could be held liable for publishing discriminatory advertisements,
particularly in their classifieds section, where they had no hand in drafting
or editing. The Fourth Circuit answered this question quickly, putting
newspapers squarely in the statutory crosshairs:
The section here under examination provides on its face no exemptions in favor of newspapers. Rather, it uses precisely the
language which would lead the ordinary reader to conclude that
newspapers are to be brought within its purview... In the context of classified real estate advertising, landlords and brokers
"cause" advertisements to be printed or published and generally newspapers "print" and "publish" them. Since each phrase

18 See United States v.Hunter, 459

F.2d 205, 210-1i

(4th Cir.

1972).

19 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2oo6).
2o Robert G.Schwemm, DiscriminatoryHousingStatements and §36o4(c): A New Look at the
Most IntriguingProvision,29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 198-99 (2001).
FairHousingAct's
21 See generally id. at zoo- I (comparing the wording of several drafts of the bill that
became the FHA, the final text, and sister statutes as evidence of broad enforcement goals).
22 See Hunter,459 Fd at 209-1 i.
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in a statute must, if possible, be given effect,
2 3 both landlords and
newspapers are within the section's reach.

About two months later, the D.C. Circuit expanded the range of potential
defendants further by finding that the recorder of deeds for the District of
Columbia had violated the FHA by accepting instruments for filing that
included racially restrictive covenants, noting that the recorder "certainly
publishes [barred notices and statements] by collecting them in a manner
that facilitates access to them by prospective buyers." 24 More recent cases
have also made clear that live-in landlords exempt from many of the FHA's
other strictures are not exempt from § 3604(c).15 In sum, these decisions
show that § 3604(c) applies to a wide range of defendants, perhaps wider
than any other section of the FHA.
The class of potential plaintiffs able to show standing in § 3604(c)
claims is similarly expansive. The statute on its face authorizes a suit by
any "aggrieved person,"' 6 meaning a person injured by any practice barred
by §§ 3604, 3605, 3606, or 3617.7 Even the mere belief that one is about
to be injured by a discriminatory housing practice is enough to satisfy
the statutory requirements to bring a suit. 8 In 1972, the Supreme Court
concluded that this language evidenced "a congressional intention to define
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution,' 2 9 and
a decade later reaffirmed that "the sole requirement for standing to sue
under [the Fair Housing Act] is the Art. III minima of injury in fact: that
the plaintiff allege that as a result of the defendant's actions he has suffered
23

Id. at

24

Mayers v. Ridley, 465

(citations omitted).
o
F.2d 63 , 633 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
25 The "Mrs. Murphy" exemption of § 3603(b)(2) provides a broad but not absolute
exemption from § 3604 for live-in landlords. The text of the section does not exempt live-in
landlords from § 3604(c), nor has subsequent jurisprudence barred enforcement of § 3604(c)
against live-in landlords who have made discriminatory statements or advertisements. See, e.g.,
HUD v. Roberts, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 925,151, at 26,215-16 (HUD ALJ 2001); HUD
v. Schmid, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,139 (HUD ALJ 1999); HUD v. Gruzdaitis, Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. ( 25,137 (HUD ALJ 1998); HUD v. Dellipaoli, Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep.1 25,127 (HUD ALJ 1997).
26 42 U.S.C. 88 36 1(a)(1)(A)(i), 3613(a)(i)(A) (2oo6).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 36o2(i)(0, 3 602(f) (2oo6).
28 42 U.S.C. §3 6o2(i)(2) (2oo6).
29 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (quoting Hackett v.
McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.d 442,446 (3d Cir. 1971)).All of these decisions have hinged upon
the words "persons aggrieved." Though Title VII employs the same language, it has recently
been construed more narrowly:
210

For Title VII standing purposes, the term 'person aggrieved' must be construed
more narrowly than the outer boundaries of Article III.
Dictum in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., suggesting that Title VII's aggrievement requirement
reaches as faras Article II permits, is too expansive and the Court declines to
follow it.
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863, 866 (2o1i) (citations omitted).
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'a distinct and palpable injury."' 30 This requirement may be satisfied by a
wide range of injuries, including financial losses, emotional damages, and
loss of interracial relations.3
The standard for finding a violation of§ 3604(c) also sets a low threshold,
enough so that many claims surviving the standing inquiry have a solid
chance of winning on the merits. The statute itself states that it shall be
unlawful "to... publish ... any.., advertisement, with respect to the sale
or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference ... based on [a barred
ground]. ' 3 The significance of this language was analyzed extensively in
the Human Models Cases, a series of suits focused on the discriminatory
effects of housing ads displaying white models to the exclusion of other
races. Through the late 1980s and early 1990s, courts focused upon the
expansiveness of the words "indicate" and "preference" to develop an
objective "ordinary reader" standard. As summarized by the Seventh
Circuit:
"[Tihe statute [is] violated if an ad for housing suggests to an
ordinary reader that a particular [protected group] is preferred or
dispreferred for the housing in question." In applying the "ordinary reader" test, courts have not required that ads jump out at
the reader with their offending message, but have found instead
that the statute is violated by "any ad that would discourage an
ordinary
reader of a particular [protected group] from answering
33
it."

This low threshold establishes an immense field of potential plaintiffs
when coupled with § 3604(c)'s expansive standing jurisprudence.
"[C]ourts have generally held that the mere receipt or observation of such
ads is sufficient to confer standing on a minority reader."3 4 In so construing
the statute, courts have not been blind to the potential for crippling liability
to newspaper publishers, particularly given the sheer volume of classified
advertising in any given paper. Even so, the immense liability that could
flow from a single page of ads has done little to change lower federal courts'
application of § 3604(c):
[A] claimant may establish a prima facie case for such damages
simply by oral testimony that he or she is a newspaper reader
of a race [disfavored by a body of advertisements] and was substantially insulted and distressed by a certain ad. The potential
30 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 372 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490,501 (1975)).
31 ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 12A:3 (2010).
32 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
33 Jancik v. HUD, 44 F3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923
Ezd 995,999-1000 (zd Cir. 1991) (citations omitted)).
34 Robert G. Schwemm, DiscriminatoryHousing Statements and§ 36o4(c): A New Look atthe
FairHousing Acta ost IntriguingProvision,29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 310 (zoo I).
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for large numbers of truly baseless claims for emotional injury
thus exists, and there appears to be no ready device, other than
wholly speculative judgments as to credibility, to separate the
genuine from the baseless. However, we do not regard this possibility as a reason to immunize publishers from any liability under
Section 3604(c) ....35

Thus, the FHA (and § 3604(c) in particular) has established vast classes
of discriminatory conduct and potential parties to suit, through both its
plain language and subsequent judicial interpretation of that language.
For small newspapers serving minority communities, the issue of potential
§ 3604(c) liability is a critical one: FHA litigation and liability arising from a
single advertisement (much less daily classifieds stretching across multiple
pages) could pose a significant threat to their survival. The contours of the
protected classes, and the question of whether language implicates any of
those classes, are by extension proportionately weighty issues.

II.

NATIONAL ORIGIN IN THE STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CONTEXT

Though Congress adopted a broad range of prohibited grounds
for discrimination in the civil rights statutes of the 1960s, the historical
context and legislative history show that congressional attention was
squarely focused on addressing problems specific to the African American
community. "America in that era was a white and black society divided
approximately nine to one, respectively, between Caucasians and
African-Americans.... IT]he situation... was very different from today's
demographics where Hispanic-Americans form the largest minority
community in America."3 6 Census Bureau statistics back up the history:
"[p]eople of races other than White or Black represented less than
1 percent of the U.S. population between 1900 and 1960." 3 In the years
soon after the FHA's adoption, this number rested at 1.4%. 31 Congressional
preoccupation with the predominant racial binary of the time kept debates
on Title VII and the FHA from addressing subtle contours of the protected
classes.
National origin in particular received precious little attention in the
debates. As Juan Perea notes, national origin "was part of the 'boilerplate'
statutory language ....At the time, Congress gave no serious thought to

the content of the national origin term nor to its proper scope."39 In his

35 Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1005 (emphasis added).

36 James Leonard, Title VII and the Protection of Minority Languages in the American
Workplace: The Searchfor Justification,72 Mo. L. REV. 745, 748 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
37 FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS,
SERIES CENSR-4: DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 76 (2002).
38 Id.
39 Juan E Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination
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examination of the legislative history leading up to the adoption of Title
VII, Perea found that "references to the term were sporadic and relatively
insignificant, certainly so in relation to the extensive consideration given
to the problems of discrimination against African Americans. The debate
in the House of Representatives yielded no definition or explanation of
what national origin discrimination meant."40 While Perea is correct that no
definitive meaning was established, there was some meaningful debate on
national origin that clarifies congressional thought at the time. Given the
close relationship between Title VII and the FHA,4' these have significant
persuasive (though by no means decisive) value in establishing definitions
applicable to the FHA.
During floor debates on what would become Title VII, in response to a
question on whether an employer advertising for an "Anglo-Saxon" would
offend the prohibition on national origin discrimination, Representative
James Roosevelt responded:
May I just make very clear that "national origin" means
national. It means the country from which you or your forebears
came from [sic]. You may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia,
England, France, or any other country. It has nothing to 4do with
such broad terms such as the gentleman has referred to.
Roosevelt's statement is arguably the clearest articulation of Congressional
intent on national origin.43 Other statements during the floor debates are
consistent with this narrow construction, such as Representative Charles
Dent's statement that national origin "has nothing to do with color, religion,
or the race of an individual."'
Subtler aspects of national origin were left to the judiciary to develop.
In 1974, the Supreme Court largely adopted Congress's reasoning in the
debates, stating that "[t]he term 'national origin' on its face refers to the
country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which
46
his or her ancestors came."' 4s While this definition is arguably circular,
it appears to restrict the word "nation" to an ancestral origin within the
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 807 (994) (footnote omitted).
40 Id.at 817-18 (footnotes omitted).
41 The language of the statutes largely track each other, and any differences between
the two have been interpreted as significant. The protected classes in the two statutes are
identical, and the closeness in the enactment dates suggest that where the language is the
same, Congress intended the language to have identical significance.
42 1 oCONG. REC. 2549 (1964) (statement of Rep. Roosevelt).
43 See generally Perea,supra note 39, at 817-22(1994) (illustrating the paucity of discussion
of the national origin term within Title VII legislative history).
44 110 CONG. REc. 2549 (1964) (statement of Rep. Dent).
45 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,88 (1973).
46 Black's Law Dictionary defines "country" as "[a] nation or political state." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIoNARY 404 (9th ed. 2009).
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geographic bounds of a particular political territory, a construction which
substantially narrows the range of protected characteristics associated with
a nationality. Secondary physical and cultural traits would not appear to be
within the ambit of such a definition.
Since that decision, however, some lower federal courts have ignored
the geographical or nation-state construction and redefined national origin
more broadly, based on the vagueness inherent in the term "nation."
Black's Law Dictionary's entry for nation points out the difficulty of giving
the word any single definition:
The nearest we can get to a definition is to say that a nation is
a group of people bound together by common history, common
sentiment and traditions, and, usually (though not always, as,
for example, Belgium or Switzerland) by common heritage. A
state, on the other hand, is a society of men united under one
government. These two forms of society are not necessarily
coincident. A single nation may be divided into several states,
and conversely 47a single state may comprise several nations or
parts of nations.
A reading of national origin premised on this construction of nation
can easily expand beyond the bounds of the narrow readings endorsed
by Congress and the Supreme Court, an approach which many courts
have pursued to better protect minority plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit and
Northern District of California have read national origin to include physical
characteristics (particularly height) common to that nationality.4" Some
courts have found national origin where a nation-state no longer existed,
such as the Ninth Circuit's holding that "Serbian" was a protected national
origin, though Serbia no longer existed at the time of filing,49 and a similar
holding in the District of Minnesota on Ukrainian national origin.50 There
are even cases recognizing a protected national origin where the nation
in question has existed neither as a political entity nor a consistent and
definable geography, turning the Supreme Court's definition on its head
and adopting an ethnicity-based model."s

47

BLACK'S

LAW

DICTIONARY

1121

(9th

ed.

2009)

(quoting

JOHN

SALMOND,

136 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)). The entry for "national origin,"
however, adopts a definition nearly identical to the Supreme Court's nation-state take in Espinoza.
Id. at 1124.
48 See Davis v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
minimum height requirement for firemen had a disparate impact on Mexican Americans and
was not proven to be job related); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 395 E Supp.
378, 38o-8I (N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding minimum height restriction for police officers had a
disparate impact on Hispanics, Asians, and women).
49 Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1988).
50 Kovalevsky v. West Publ'g Co., 674 F Supp. 1379, 1384-85 (D. Minn. 1987).
Si See, e.g., Janko v. I11.State Toll Highway Auth., 704 F Supp. 1531 (N.D.Ill.I989)
(holding that "Gypsy" falls within the term "national origin" in the Title VII context, though
JURISPRUDENCE
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As the cases show, the definition of national origin under Title VII has
been at best inconsistent-at times even ad hoc. It is hardly surprising,
then, that the role of language in the national origin class underTitle VII has
been a subject of vigorous debate and further inconsistent jurisprudence.
III.

LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL ORIGIN

A. Title VII Approaches
In and of itself, language is not one of the enumerated classes protected
under the civil rights statutes of the 1960s. Both Title VII and the FHA
addressed a nation that was almost entirely monolingual Englishspeaking."2 As one scholar noted, "the situation addressed . . . was very
different from today's demographics where . .. immigration has created
language policy issues that didn't exist in the monolingual Sixties."53
Thus it has largely been left to administrative agencies, academics, and
courts to decide whether language is correlated with any one protected
class so closely as to render language discrimination illegal. Much of this
debate has centered on the potential link between language and national
origin, with a particular focus on the conflicts between a growing Hispanic
workforce and the rise in Speak-English-Only rules.54 Some elements of
this debate are relevant to the FHA, while others represent meaningful
points of distinction between the statutes, distinctions that should inform
their respective enforcement schemes.
Advocates of equivalence between language and national origin argue
that characteristics closely intertwined with one's national origin must
be included to successfully deter subtler discriminatory conduct. These
arguments proceed from the more expansive definition of nation, reading
national origin as both a geographic origin point and those characteristics
generally associated with it. The position has found some support in
the federal agency administering Title VII, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which "defines national origin . ..
as . .. an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or . . . the
physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." 5
the group famously lacks a common geography, and arguably even lacks many of the markers
of a common ethnicity); Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F Supp. 215
(W.D. La. 198o) (holding that "Acadian" is a protected national origin, though there was never
a country of Acadia).
52 Seesupra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
53 Leonard, supra note 36, at 748.
54 See, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understandingthe Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of
Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1347, 1349-50

(1997)55 29C.ER.§ I6o6.1 (2o1).
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Elaborating on the "linguistic characteristics" element, the EEOC states
that "[t]he primary language of an individual is often an essential national
origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace,
from speaking their primary language or the language they speak most
comfortably, disadvantages an
individual's employment opportunities on
56
the basis of national origin."
Some courts have subscribed to this position, though to varying degrees.
One line of cases has found a consistent link between primary language
and national origin, holding that discrimination on the basis of primary
language, without reference to other linguistic or cultural markers, is national
origin discrimination.57 Other courts have recognized more attenuated
connections, including a line of cases focusing on the relationship between
accents and national origin, holding that adverse employment action based
on accents that did not seriously impede job performance violated Title
VII's prohibition against national origin discrimination."
Detractors of this model argue that that the legislative history
surrounding Title VII is simply too scant to allow for anything more
than a plain-language reading of the statute, which lacks any indication
of equivalence between language and national origin.59 They also argue
that recognizing such a link has potentially significant detrimental effects
specific to the employment context: while national origin in and of itself is
not likely to have any effect upon one's ability to perform a particular job,
an inability to speak English can seriously undermine one's value to an
employer, a point that even advocates of minority language rights concede.60

56 29 C.F.R. § i6o6.7 (2012).
57 E.g., Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838 E2d 1031, 1039 ( 9 th Cir. 1988) ("[Plrimary language
not only conveys certain concepts, but is itself an affirmation of [a national origin's] culture."),
vacated as moot, 490 U.S. IOI6 (1989); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 Ezd 1511, 1520 (9th Cir.
1986) (en banc) ("[An individual's primary language skill generally flows from his or her
national origin."), vacatedas moot, 484 U.S. 8o6 (1987).
58 E.g., Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989) ("An adverse
employment decision may be predicated upon an individual's accent when-but only whenit interferes materially with job performance."); Carino v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 E2d
815, 819 (ioth Cir. 1984) ("A foreign accent that does not interfere with a Title VII claimant's
ability to perform duties of the position he has been denied is not a legitimate justification
for adverse employment decisions."); Bell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 1549, 1555
(M.D.N.C. 1984) ("[I]f plaintiff could prove that he had been discriminated against because
of his accent, he would establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination.").
59 This class even includes Juan E Perea, a scholar who might be described as a radical
multiculturalist. While Perea does advocate for protection of ethnic characteristics, he argues
that courts cannot and should not shoehorn ethnic traits into the national origin class, but
rather adopt a class of ethnic trait protections. See Perea, supra note 39.
60 See, e.g., Juan E Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's PrimaryLanguage
in the Workplace, 23 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 265, 299 (1990) (conceding that a Spanish-speaking
sales clerk who refuses to speak English to exclusively Anglophone customers is not
performing his job of selling).
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A further argument notes that the prohibited bases for discrimination, as a
group, refer to immutable characteristics,6 and that only a limited reading
of national origin maintains this consistency, as bilinguals can presumably
choose the language they speak.6"
Many courts confronting the issue have adopted the narrow construction,
excising language from the characteristics protected by the bar on national
origin discrimination. While noting the significance of language and
ethnicity to a particular national origin group, courts have generally held
that Speak-English-Only rules in the workplace (and adverse employment
actions pursuant to such rules) do not offend the bar on national origin
discrimination when applied to bilingual employees speaking languages
other than English as their primary language.63 As the Fifth Circuit put it,
"[n]either the statute nor common understanding equates national origin
with the language that one chooses to speak."'
While both positions have a role to play in informing the debate on the
significance of language in national origin discrimination under the FHA,
perhaps most informative is the common ground between the two. Both
positions underscore the "importance of a person's language of preference
or other aspects of his national, ethnic or racial self-identification,"65 and
note that "[d]ifferences in language and other cultural attributes may not
be used as a fulcrum for discrimination. '66 Additionally, both agree that
language, in particular a grasp of English, is critical in the employment
context. As one scholar has put it, "a knowledge of English is plainly relevant
61 It has been argued that religion, insofar as it is possible to convert from or leave a faith,
is a mutable characteristic, but that discrimination against it is nonetheless prejudicial in a
legal sense. Robert Post, PrejudicialAppearances: The Logic of American AntidiscriminationLaw,
88 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 8 (2000).
62 See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 36 (arguing that language, as a mutable characteristic,
cannot fall within the definition of national origin). Critics of this line of argument find that
it operates as a mere smokescreen for discrimination against particular ethnic groups. As one
scholar puts it:
Unlike African Americans who are incapable of changing their skin color, ethnic
minorities technically possess the ability to give up their mother tongue or other
traits closely tied to their national origin. Largely because of this technicality,
discrimination against immigrants evokes less sympathy; a common view is that
the responsibility lies with ethnic minorities themselves who choose to retain
their ties with their own culture. In other words, discrimination becomes a natural
consequence of their failure to assimilate into the dominant culture.

Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, LanguageMinorities:Fogotten Victims of Discrimination?,11 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 747, 781 (997).
63 E.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 E2d 148o, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Tihe enactment
of an English-only while working policy does not inexorably lead to an abusive environment
for those whose primary language is not English."); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 Ezd 264 (5th Cir.
198o).
64 Gloor, 618 E2d at 268.
65 Id. at 270.
66 Id.
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to job performance. No one would make a straight-faced argument that the
ability to speak English is irrelevant or marginal to most jobs. English is
the de facto national language. Our commercial and government culture is
Anglophone. '' 67 While the FHA must recognize the importance of language
implied by these cases, the practical concerns so central to language use in
employment are largely inapplicable to the housing context.
B. DefiningNational Origin underthe FHA
Given the similarity between the texts, purposes, and legislative
histories of the two statutes, it would stand to reason that national origin
under the FHA should be viewed through the same lens as that of Title
VII, one which the Court has restricted to a geographical point of personal
or ancestral origin. However, as previous sections of this paper have
demonstrated, the language of § 3604(c) and subsequent jurisprudence
have developed the FHA into a much wider-reaching statute in terms of
the statements it bars, the identity of potentially liable parties, and the
range of judicially cognizable injuries. 6 With § 3604(c) claims already
being rare, finding judicial interpretations of national origin's significance
in the § 3604(c) context, let alone the significance of language to that class,
is nearly impossible. However, one point is clear: to be consistent with the
larger body of FHA jurisprudence, courts must adopt a more expansive
interpretation of national origin. This FHA-specific definition must include
language to fully effectuate the statute's goals. This is particularly true of
§ 3604(c), given its intense focus on communication and its discriminatory
effects, however subtle they may be.
As a starting point, it is necessary to distinguish the statutory objectives
of the FHA from those of Title VII. In a vacuum, it would appear that
Title VII's construction of various terms would control the application of
identical language in the FHA. However, the FHA's purposes have always
been distinguishable from those of Title VII and related statutes:
The Supreme Court's first review of the FHA ... conclud[ed]
that residential integration was a major goal of the statute.
Thereafter, courts regularly . .. conclude[d] that the FHA is
intended not only to advance minority housing rights but also to
achieve integration. In this respect, the congressional concerns
underlying the FHA were broader than those of Title VII, which
is intended to expand minority employment opportunities and

67 Leonard, supra note 36, at 758 (citations omitted).
68 See supra Part II. The FHA bars discriminatory "statements," and Congress briefly
added "written or oral" during the drafting process; both the earlier Title VII and later-enacted
Age Discrimination in Employment Act avoided such expansive language. See Schwemm,
supra note 2o, at 209-i1.
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lead to an integrated work
force, but does not place a strong
69
value on integration perse.

As a result of these differences, courts have accorded different meaning to
words appearing in both the FHA and Title VII. 70 Arguably, the reasoning
behind the Supreme Court's narrow take on national origin in Title VII
is distinguishable and may not even translate to the FHA. Given the
history of broad administration and statutory construction it has enjoyed,
it is reasonable to construe national origin under the FHA as not only an
ancestral origin point, but also those secondary characteristics with which
it is closely correlated.
As with Title VII, the initial question is whether language is so closely
tied to national origin that one generally implies the other, keeping in
mind the "congressional desire to promote integrated living patterns"
specific to the FHA.71 From a social science perspective, the assimilative
language dynamic theory7" suggests that such close ties exist, particularly
in first- and second-generation immigrants-those most likely to bear the
"physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group."7 3
The assimilative language dynamic is a seemingly inescapable trend from
monolingual foreign language fluency toward a monolingual Englishspeaking household. Studies of monolingual Spanish-speaking immigrants
in the United States have
confirm[ed] a classic three-generation pattern of language
acquisition. The first generation is primarily monolingual, the
second generation is bilingual, and in the third generation
English is the preferred language over Spanish. A second
study . . . conclude[d]

that the rate of Anglicization by

Spanish speakers cannot be distinguished from prior waves of
immigrants .... Spanish monolingualism persists because of

continued immigration, not because Spanish immigrants fail to
74
learn to speak English.

Recent census data is consistent with this trend across a wide range of
languages: as of 2007, the majority of those speaking languages other than

69 Schwemm, supra note 2o, at 213 (citations omitted).
70 See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 866 (20 11) (distinguishing
the significance of the term "aggrieved person" in Title VII and the FHA through the former's
comparatively narrow "zone of interests").
71 Schwemm, supra note 2o, at 2 13 (citations omitted).
72 This theory, in broad strokes, posits that immigrant families move from linguistic
isolation to monolingual English fluency over two to three generations. See, e.g., KEVIN F.
MCCARTHY & R. BURCIAGA VALDEZ, CURRENT AND FUTURE EFFECTS OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION
IN CALIFORNIA 54-66 (1986); CALVIN VELTMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE SPANISH LANGUAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES

3,66 (Carol Oppenheimer & Stina Santiestevan, eds.) (1988).

73 29 C.ER. § i6o6.1

(2012).

74 Carol Schmid, Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the Public and
PrivateSector, zo N.C. CENT. L.J. 65, 71 (1992).
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English in the home were foreign-born, and only foreign-born speakers
were more likely than not to speak English "[less than 'very well."'' 1 5 At
least statistically, discriminating on the basis of language would have the
effect of selecting for first- or second-generation immigrants of a particular
6
7

national origin.

Given this correlation, language could easily be incorporated within
an FHA-specific definition of national origin,77 absent significant
countervailing concerns. As noted previously, Title VII jurisprudence
has established a range of such practical considerations, centering on
the general incompatibility between multilingual workplaces and a
monolingual society at large.78 As informative as these arguments may
be, they are tied to employment concerns that lack force in the housing
context. While language barriers may complicate negotiation of lease terms
or loan agreements, home rental is largely a series of arms-length payments,
and the purchase of a home, while an immense undertaking, is a one-time
transaction. The impact of a foreign language in the office is much deeper
and may affect the employment relationship on a daily basis.79 These
concerns are generally inapposite to housing.
IV.

APPLICATIONS - THE ORDINARY READER STANDARD AND FOREIGN
LANGUAGE ADVERTISING

Having established that language is an element of national origin under
the FHA and that selection for the former effects a selection for the latter,
the next question is whether foreign language advertising for housing
violates the strictures of § 3604(c). This issue appears to have evaded
discussion in published opinion, though one case arising from facts closely
related to the foreign-language advertising context offers some insight into
how the question might be decided. Given that this case arose before the

75 HYON B. SHIN & ROBERT A. KOMINSKI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2007 4, Fig.2b (20IO), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/zoiopubs/acsi2.pdf.
76 The Spanish language presents a rather difficult problem, given that it is by far
the most widely spoken non-English language in the United States and is not specific to a
particular nation. A colorable argument could be made that the selection here is for a particular
race, but even this fails to capture the diversity of the Hispanic community.
77 An argument could be made that the assimilative language dynamic is more indicative
of alienage than national origin, the former being outside the protections of the FHA.
However, the assimilative language dynamic model states that second-generation immigrants
(i.e., not foreign-born) are generally bilingual as well, and in any case foreign birth is not
synonymous with alienage.
78 See Leonard, supra note 36, at 758; Perea, supra note 60, at 299.
79 Record-keeping, intra-office communication, workplace harmony, and client contact
are just a few of the critical day-to-day employment functions affected by a multilingual office.
Leonard, supranote 36, at 756, 758-59.
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establishment of the ordinary reader standard, the issue will be further
investigated under contemporary § 3604(c) tests.
Only one published opinion has discussed the legality of preferring a
particular language in an advertisement for housing. In Holmgren v. Little
Village Community Reporter,80 three Chicago neighborhood newspapers
published English-language classified ads which allegedly showed a
preference for tenants and buyers of Polish, Bohemian, Slavish, German,
Spanish and American nationalities. The plaintiff was a SwedishAmerican. 8 1 In response to the allegations, the publishers argued that they
were not selecting for national origin, but instead preferring purchasers and
tenants who could speak a certain language in the interest of facilitating
communication between both sides of the transaction. The court was not
convinced:
[T]o say that the ability to speak a certain language is not related
to the country of origin of that language is mere sophistry. An
advertisement for a Polish-speaking tenant, for example, is
tantamount to an advertisement for an immigrant (or the
offspring of an immigrant) of Poland itself. It is significant
that § 3604(c) makes it unlawful not only to print an ad which
indicates a preference base on national origin, but also an ad
which indicates "an intention to make any such preference."
Even if an ad for a person who speaks a certain language is
deemed not to indicate a preference for a person of a certain
national origin, a proposition which I find untenable, then the ad
at least demonstrates "an intention" to make such a preference.
Thus, the ads which indicate a preference for a purchaser or a
tenant who speaks a particular language are unlawful under §
3604(c).8"
Judge Decker noted the potential difficulties inherent in a multilingual
housing relationship, but did not find them compelling enough to overcome
the FHA's clear prohibition against national origin bias in a housing
advertisement. 3
Holmgren accepts that language and national origin are correlated
closely enough to make selecting for a foreign language impermissible
discrimination. However, it fails to address the more subtle question of
whether an advertisement which expresses no such interest in its text
might still effect discrimination through the language in which it is
conveyed. It appears that no court has yet ruled on this particular question.
8o Holmgren v.Little Vill. Cmty. Reporter, 342 E Supp. 512 (N.D. I11.197i).
81 Id. at 513.
82 Id.

83 "The court appreciates the difficulties inherent in any language barrier that comes
between parties negotiating a contract. However... defendants cannot publish advertisements
which indicate a preference for buyers or tenants of particular national origins." The court did
note that the landlords would be free to exercise such discretion in their personal negotiations
so long as they complied with the rest of the statute. Id.at 513-14.
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The following analysis applies the ordinary reader standard to an ad typical
of those appearing in Chinese language daily newspapers. 84
A 2012 edition of the San Francisco Sing Tao Daily carried the following
advertisement:

Castro

Valley-:: P--

I, ,,,,F ERI
I4
In translation it reads, "House to rent: Castro Valley. Two bedrooms,
one living room, all newly repaired. Good school district, near high and
elementary schools. Rent includes water and garbage. Near subway and
bus stations." '
Recalling § 3604(c)'s statement, in relevant part, that it is unlawful
"[t]o ... publish ... any ... advertisement, with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference.. . based on ...national

origin," the question becomes whether the advertisement indicates a
barred national origin preference. As the Second Circuit noted in one of
the Human Models Cases, "liability will follow only when an ordinary reader
would understand the ad as suggesting a [national origin] preference. The
ordinary reader is neither the most suspicious nor the most insensitive of
our citizenry."816 As one commentator put it, he is "the reasonable man,
reasonable juror, as found throughout American jurisprudence,"87 without
a particular national origin of his own. 8 Finally, the ad will only express
84 In researching the topic, I have relied mostly on ads from two national dailies: the SING
DAILY, founded in Hong Kong in 1938 with US offices and distribution since 1975; and
the WORLD JOURNAL, founded in 1976 by Taiwanese ownership, which claims to be the most
widely read Chinese paper in the United States. This is by no means the entirety of Chinese
newspaper distribution in the United States. There are a number of more local weekly papers
serving smaller communities, like THE SEATTLE CHINESE POST and the ST. Louis CHINESE
AMERICAN NEWS. However, given that the national dailies are more widely distributed and
attract more advertisers, they are richer sources of ads and better suited to this study.
85 Classifieds, SING TAO DAILY (S.E), Feb. 3, 2012, at C6.
86 Ragin v.N.Y. Times Co., 923 E2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
87 John A. Obee, Advertising Discrimination in Housing: Fair Housing Center of
Metropolitan Detroit v. Henry Ford Village: A Modelfor Effective, Affirmative Relief Under the
FederalFairHousing Statute, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2005).
88 See Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F3d 256, 266-67 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
TAO
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a preference if it would "discourage an ordinary reader of a particular
[national origin] from answering it."8 9

Divorced from the language it is communicated in, the text itself
shows no preference for one national origin over another. There is no overt
statement that the landlord prefers Chinese residents, 90 any such message
is conferred only through the fact that the content of the ad is almost
entirely in Chinese. 91 The question is then. whether that language choice
will indicate to the ordinary reader that a renter of some Greater-Chinese
nationality is preferred. 9
By any honest appraisal, keeping in mind that the ordinary reader has
no national origin of his own, the ordinary reader is a monolingual English
speaker. From a common-sense perspective, English is the "de facto
national language," as courts and advocates of minority language rights
have acknowledged. 93 From a theoretical perspective, the assimilative
language dynamic suggests that in immigrant communities, only the first
and second generations of a particular national origin could understand a
foreign language advertisement. Even a purely statistical inquiry supports
this conclusion: for the vast majority of ancestries, including those with
a stronger bilingual character, English fluency is the norm rather than
the exception.94 In effect, the Sing Tao Daily advertisement screens all
tenants other than those from Greater China, with the added wrinkle that
it narrows the field to those with ancestry in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macau
plaintiff's arguments for an "ordinary African-American reader" and reaffirming the ordinary
reader standard); Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 8oi E Supp. 1213, 1227 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
89 Ragin, 923 F.2d at IOOO.
90 This is perhaps because no such statement is necessary; many ads will violate
§36o4(c)'s rules on other protected classes, for instance by describing apartments as suiting
single men, a violation of both the family status and sex protected class provisions.
91 More specifically, the ad is written in traditional Chinese, rather than the simplified
form used in Singapore and Mainland China. Ads of this sort also almost never include text in
any other language, nor translations (except in cases of words with no agreed-upon translation
or transliteration).
92 The term "Greater China" refers to the Sinophone world of China, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Macau, as originally "coined by Japanese economists to describe the increasing
economic integration [in the region]." AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL
LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALITY 60 (1999).
93 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (striking down restriction on
instruction in languages other than English, but noting that the failure to learn English hinders
a child's ability to become a fully participating citizen); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1220
(6th Cir. 1975) ("[Tlhe common, national language of the United States is English."); Gerald
P. L6pez, LearningAbout Latinos, 19 CHicANO-LATINo L. REV. 363, 405 (1998) ("English has
long been the de facto national language.").
94 HYON B. SHIN & ROBERT A. KOMINSKI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2007 7,tbl.3 (20 1O) (showing that for most languages, the majority of bilinguals
will speak English "[viery well"), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2oopubs/acs-12.
pdf.
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by appearing in Traditional Chinese.95 The ordinary reader would likely
be compelled to conclude that the ad would discourage those of other
national origins from answering. The same rationale would apply to each
advertisement in that day's classified section.
Even viewed in the best light, this conclusion is an ominous one:
the FHA makes illegal the kind of advertising that would help a recent
immigrant find a home in an unfamiliar city. As Judge Posner stated in a
Title VII case on similar issues:
The United States has many recent immigrants, and today
as historically they tend to cluster in their own communities,
united by ties of language, culture, and background ....
Derided
as clannish, resented for their ambition and hard work, hated
or despised for their otherness, recent immigrants are frequent
targets of discrimination, some of it violent. Itwould be a bitter
irony if the federal . . . antidiscrimination laws succeeded ...
kick[ing] these people off the ladder by compelling them to
institute costly [advertising policies].'
Nonetheless, the legislative history of the FHA expresses an overt
interest in breaking up ethnic enclaves. Senator Mondale, in sponsoring
the bill, underscored his fear of a future in which "we are going to live
separately in white ghettos and Negro ghettos,"97 "two separate Americas
constantly at war with one another."9 8 Representative Ryan saw the law
as playing a role in "achiev[ing] the aim of an integrated society." 99 Given
that there is a clear violation of the statute, the balancing of interests in
protecting immigrant rights and effectuating the statute's purpose is central
to any principled system of judicial enforcement of § 3604(c).
V.

APPROACHES TO ENFORCEMENT

Having found that foreign language advertisements violate § 3604(c)'s
bar on national origin discrimination, the only remaining issues are how the
judiciary should adjudicate these claims, and what steps advertisers should
take to avoid potential liability.

95 Though the text would likely be comprehensible by readers of simplified Chinese
(i.e., readers from Singapore or Mainland China), the overall "message" of the ads, even to
an ordinary Chinese reader, would express a preference for a tenant from a territory which
primarily uses traditional characters.
96 EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 E2d 233, 237-38 (7th Cit. 1993).
97 114 CONG. REC. 2276 (1968).

98 Id. at 2274.
99 Id. at 9591; see Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate(and What
Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 455, 460 (2007) (noting that the FHA's initial
provision "boldly declares that 'it is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States').
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One response to discrimination through monolingual non-English
ads is simply to allow landlords to continue to publish foreign language
advertisements absent a more overt discriminatory act. This position has
an advantage in the normative policies of multiculturalism, protecting
ethnic enclaves and maintaining foreign-language advertising's role in
providing ready access to housing for recent immigrants by avoiding a strict
enforcement model that could disadvantage those communities most in
need of protection.
Maintaining the status quo in this fashion finds some additional support
in law and economics theories, preferring market forces as the mechanism
that will pressure landlords to comply with the statute. As Schwemm
summarizes Judge Richard Posner's position on this point:
[B]ecause market participants with the least prejudice have a
competitive advantage over those who discriminate, economic
forces will on their own "tend to minimize discrimination."
Posner recognizes that some people have a "taste for
discrimination," that is, they are willing to pay a price to avoid
associating with other races, by, for example, refusing "to sell
their house to blacks who are willing to pay higher prices
than white purchasers." This means, according to Posner, that
providers with the least prejudice will have lower costs° and will
therefore ultimately "come to dominate the market."'"
However, as Schwemm later notes, "to read Posner on civil rights is
indeed to enter a fantasy world." 1" Even when restricted to the economic
realm, competing theories suggest that absent intervention segregation
will continue.101 Given the expansive jurisprudence accorded the FHA by
the courts, and the clear statutory intent to promote integration, law and
economics hardly seems a workable model for enforcement in the face of a
10 3
clear violation of § 3604(c).
Against the backdrop of prior FHA jurisprudence, it would be a
directional shift (if not a total about-face) to recognize a violation and
elect not to confront it. The question of what form enforcement should
take then becomes one of extent: whether to take the opposite extreme
and mandate English-only advertising for housing, or construct a median,
compromise position.
The English-only option is also likely at odds with the FHA's statutory
objectives. From a strictly statutory perspective, though English-only
advertisements will probably never violate § 3604(c) through their language
1oo See Schwemm, supranote 99, at 490-91 (citations omitted).

ioi Id.at 490.
102 In particular, Schelling Segregation suggests that even a minimal preference
for neighbors like oneself will rapidly segregate communities. See THoIAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 147-55 (1978).

i03 See Schwemm, supra note 99, at 455 (examining how various economic theories may
account for discrimination by landlords).
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alone, it is hard to imagine that the FHA would mandate advertising
practices that impede first- and second-generation immigrants from
finding housing. Normatively, the English-only option is distasteful at best:
any application of the FHA should be guided by the goal of integrating
housing markets, not an abstract fear that Americans will feel like outsiders
in their own hometowns. Mandatory English-only advertising smacks
uncomfortably of the "strange brew of xenophobia, hysteria and sincere
concern for the integrity of American society" that has marked the EnglishOnly movement. 1°4 If nothing else, "[olne wonders what necessitates
the power of law to reinforce the obvious fact that English is already
the common language of the United States."1 5 One man working in an
English-only workplace described the policy as a daily reminder "that I
am second-class and subject to rules for my employment that the Anglo
employees are not subject to. I feel that this rule is hanging over my head
and can be used against me at any point .

. . ."106

A judicially sanctioned

English-only policy for housing advertisements would say much the same
to recent immigrants, bilinguals, and the newspapers serving them: they
are not welcome until they successfully assimilate.10 7
Additionally, the economic impact on foreign-language newspapers
could be substantial. Classifieds in foreign-language newspapers define
themselves primarily as an alternative to mainstream publication or online
classified services, providing a valuable service to recent immigrants while
supporting a news service targeted at the interests and background of the
community in question. Removing foreign-language classifieds entirely
would both disserve their clientele and remove valuable advertising
income from already vulnerable papers.
The best compromise between the interests of linguistic minorities and
the larger English-monolingual populace of the United States is a standard
of flexible parity between English and foreign-language advertising.
Courts should mandate simply that relevant information is substantially
conveyed in both the minority language and English. This would be a
small extension of current Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
regulations, in particular § 100.75 in HUD's subchapter on Fair Housing,
which states that "[d] iscriminatory notices, statements and advertisements
include, but are not limited to: ...[sielecting media ...for advertising...

104 James Leonard, Title VII and the Protection of Minority Languages in theAmerican
Workplace: The Searchfor a Justification, 72 Mo. L. REV. 745, 755 (2007).
1o5 Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Language Minorities: Forgotten Victims of Discrimination?, ii
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 757 (1997).
1o6 Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F3d 1294, 1301 (ioth Cir. 2006).
107 See generallyJuan F. Perea, Buscando America: Why IntegrationandEqualProtectionFail
to Protect Latinos, 1 17 HARv.L. REV. 1420 (2004) (arguing that bilingual Latinos have been
subjected to a similar dynamic).
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which deny particular segments of the housing market information about
housing opportunities because of. .. national origin."' s
The flexibility inherent in this solution should neither hamstring
the discretion of the courts nor flood them with litigation. An adequate
demonstration of standing remains a significant bar to many potential
plaintiffs in a language-discrimination suit,109 though this area continues
to show some flux. " ' Courts should also take into account the context
within which advertisements are placed, and whether the body of
advertising has a discriminatory effect, rather than focusing narrowly on a
single advertisement."' FHA jurisprudence has relied heavily on judicial
discretion of this sort and has allowed for flexibility in deciding cases
involving smaller advertising operations. In describing the ordinary reader
standard, the Second Circuit has noted that the ordinary reader
does not apply a mechanical test to every use of a model of
a particular race. An ad depicting a single model or couple of
one race that is run only two or three times would seem, absent
some other direct evidence of an intentional racial message,
outside Section 3604(c)'s prohibitions as a matter of law

...

It

thus seems inevitable that the close questions of liability will
involve advertisers that either use a large number of models
and/or advertise repetitively. In such cases, the advertiser's
opportunities to include all groups are greater, and the message
conveyed by the exclusion of a racial group is stronger."'

This position may also serve language-minority communities by drawing
attention to more overtly illegal advertising practices; many Chineselanguage papers print ads whose content violates the FHA by expressing

io8 24 C.FR. § 100.75(c)(3) (2012).
I9 See, e.g., McDermott v. N.Y. Metro LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 294, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(holding that "a person who reads a discriminatory advertisement has standing to sue only
if they allege some form of personal injury, including psychic injury or substantial insult or
distress.").
11o At the very least, plaintiffs will find it difficult to bring a suit alleging psychic damages

when they failed to comprehend the content of the ad. However, some courts have adopted
a more conservative response to the standing question. See, e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d
995, 1005 (discussing the potential flood of plaintiffs seeking to sue large newspapers in the
wake of the Human Models cases, and how a court might manage such claims).
i i i See EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1993). Although this case
focused on Title VII rather than the FHA, Judge Posner's discussion of advertising in foreign
newspapers shows evidence of discrimination is not necessarily compelling:
[Defendant] did buy newspaper advertisements on three occasions-once in a
Korean-language newspaper and twice in the Chicago Tribune-but as these ads
resulted in zero hires .... The EEOC argues that the single Korean newspaper
ad, which ran for only three days and yielded not a single hire, is evidence of
discrimination. If so, it is very weak evidence.
Id.

112 Ragin, 923 F2d at
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sex or family status preferences on a daily basis, a practice whose continued
existence can only be explained by the incomprehensibility of the
13
advertisements to the populace at large.1
What exactly constitutes parity between languages will vary from
case to case, though one of the few cases to raise the issue of foreignlanguage advertising, Housing Rights Center v. Donald Sterling Corp., 4
shows how disparities in English- and foreign-language publications might
subject a landlord or newspaper to liability. Real estate mogul, attorney,
and Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling was sued for a series of
discriminatory acts against non-Korean plaintiffs in apartment buildings
located in Los Angeles's Koreatown neighborhood." 5 The complaint
specifically addressed foreign language advertising, alleging that the
defendants had engaged in a discriminatory marketing strategy:
Advertisements in the Korean language provide more
information than found elsewhere about vacancies, rent, number
of bedrooms, amenities, building facilities, the neighborhood
profile, etc. For example, large banners in the Korean language
posted at each of the subject properties provide more information
about vacancies, rent,
number of bedrooms, amenities, and
16
building facilities."

The case was eventually settled." 7 The court indicated in its ruling on
plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction based on the § 3604(c) claim
only that "use of the word 'Korean' in the names of residential apartment
buildings would indicate to the 'ordinary reader' that the buildings' owner
is not only receptive to but actually prefers tenants of Korean national
origin,""' never reaching issues of discrepancies in ad copy between
113 A single page of the Singtao Daily classifieds section containing ninety housing ads
included over twenty-four that violated either §3604(c) or its California equivalent (Cal. Gov't
Code § 12955(c) (West), which is functionally identical to the FHA but for the addition of
several protected classes. Two ads specified a desired sex, fifteen a preferred marital status
(barred by the California statute), six had both sex and marital status requirements, and one
expressed a religious preference. While translation issues made determining whether several
ads expressed familial status preference difficult, one clearly did so, saying roughly "one or
two person space; if you have children don't bother asking."
114 Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Donald Sterling Corp., 274 E Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
115 Id. The allegations were extensive, but focused largely on management's extensive
efforts to retain Korean tenants while excluding and evicting Black and Hispanic tenants.
i 16 Third Amended Complaint and Demand for a Jury Trial, Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Donald
Sterling Corp., No. o3-CV-859 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2004) 2004 WL 5614121.
117 Sterling reportedly settled for $1.5 million, was fined $30,000 for failure to comply in
discovery, eventually paid nearly $5 million in attorney's fees to the Housing Rights Center.
See Amanda Bronstad, DiscriminationCase Costs SterlingEven Without Verdict., L.A. Bus. J., Oct.
31, 2005, at 9.
118 Hous. Rights Ctr., 274 E Supp. 2d at 1139. The court declined to issue an injunction
against using the word "Asian" and the appearance of the Korean Flag, largely due to their
location in the paper. "The announcement on which Plaintiffs rely ... does not advertise
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languages. Nevertheless, the case highlights the kinds of information
critical to potential tenants, and the sort of information that should be made
available bilingually in order to achieve functional parity across languages.
Some advertisers in foreign-language papers have already adopted
analogous practices in the employment context, particularly in positions
requiring a degree of English fluency. Employment advertisements in
the Sing Tao Daily and World Journal frequently reproduce Chinese text
in English, some going so far as to repeat e-mail addresses and phone
numbers already comprehensible across language barriers. Individual
landlords applying these practices would significantly insulate themselves
against liability, and a newspaper policy requiring bilingual classifieds
with substantial parity between languages would do much the same for a
publisher.
CONCLUSION

The Fair Housing Act, in spite of the narrowness of the problem it
originally addressed, continues to play an important role in civil rights
litigation. Given the statute's continuing vitality, it stands to reason that it
should be applied in previously unrecognized fields. Discrimination on the
basis of language presents a significant barrier to housing integration; given
the clear voice of the statute, any efforts to maintain ethnic enclaves should
be left to the markets and preferences of particular tenants and buyers.
Language discrimination should not be overlooked because it is subtle; on
the contrary, it should be aggressively pursued in order to equalize housing
opportunities across national origin barriers.

apartments for rent or sale and does not invite tenant or purchaser applications. .... Plaintiffs
acknowledged that the cited announcement appeared in the business section of the
newspaper, not in the real estate or classified section." Id.

